Abstract. Operational models of (security) protocols, on one hand, are readable and conveniently match their implementation (at a certain abstraction level). Epistemic models, on the other hand, are appropriate for specifying knowledge-related properties such as anonymity or secrecy. These two approaches to specification and verification have so far developed in parallel and one has either to define ad hoc correctness criteria for the operational model or use complicated epistemic models to specify the operational behavior. We work towards bridging this gap by proposing a combined framework which allows for modeling the behavior of a protocol in a process language with an operational semantics and supports reasoning about properties expressed in a rich logic which combines temporal and epistemic operators.
Introduction
Knowledge-related aspects are currently being recognized as very relevant when expressing and analyzing correctness requirements of complex distributed algorithms and communication protocols, from the fundamental ones aimed to reach consensus in a network, to applications like information flow control and security protocols (secrecy, anonymity, fair exchange). Therefore, many approaches based on epistemic logics have been developed for the analysis of such protocols; some examples are the BAN logic [BAN96] , the theory of function views [HS04] , interpreted systems [FHMV95, HO05, RL06] .
They allow for natural and effective representations of subtle effects of communication acts such as classified information leaking to attackers or, on the positive side, participants gaining the common knowledge that the protocol they were running meets its goal. But on the other hand, modeling protocols using epistemic-logic-based approaches requires a high degree of expertise and verification of functional properties is often very complex. The information updates generating the transitions between epistemic states are especially tedious to specify, because logics are geared to expressing properties rather than operational steps of a protocol.
The operational behaviour of protocols are, however, easily and conveniently specified in languages such as process algebras [BHR84, Mil80, AG99] and message sequence charts [CVB06] . Functional requirements such as liveness and safety are then easily verified by model checking applied on the underlying transition systems. Unfortunately, these standard and successful verification schemes use temporal logics that are not well-suited for expressing knowledge-related properties, therefore complex specialized solutions need to be sought in order to make process algebras suitable for the analysis of epistemic-flavoured properties like anonymity [SS96, COPT07] . See [HS04, EO06] for a more detailed comparison of epistemic-based vs. process-based protocol verification.
In this paper, we propose a framework that allows one to benefit the best of the two worlds, i.e., one can specify the behavior of a protocol in a process language and verify properties expressed in a logic with both temporal and epistemic operators. To achieve this, the key idea is to introduce explicit identities in our process language PAi . Then every action is annotated with a visibility range -i.e., a set of identities that are allowed to observe it and a "public appearance" -i.e., an alternative action that is observed by the identities outside the visibility range. This language is supported by an operational semantics generating annotated labeled transition systems (ALTSs), which are LTSs with, for every identity, an extra indistinguishability relation on states. These relations model the uncertainties of the identities (typically principals in a protocol) about the current state, similar to the way uncertainties are represented in standard possible-world semantics for epistemic logics [FHMV95] . Thanks to the combination of transitions and indistinguishability relations, ALTSs naturally support verification of logic formulae containing both temporal and epistemic operators. We introduce a rich logic, Eµ (epistemic µ-calculus with past) and give it am interpretation on ALTSs.
Due to the explicit use of identities, our process algebra PAi allows a precise specification of the information hiding behaviour within protocols, and it is therefore more expressive and flexible than traditional process algebras. It is also more intuitive and more formal than epistemic logics, when it comes to modelling behaviour. Further on, Eµ is more expressive than the usual temporal logics used in traditional protocol verification. The resulting model checking framework PAi +Eµ soundly extends the traditional process-based and epistemic model checking settings.
Related work The fact that the two verification approaches, process algebraic and epistemic, are complementary and that they should ideally be combined has already been recognized in [HS04] , where the aim is, just as here, to provide a framework in which both protocol specification and correctness criteria can be specified succinctly and intuitively (and the authors indeed put the two approaches in sharp contrast). However, [HS04] takes a totally different path towards its goals and develops a domain-theoretic notion of function views to define security protocols and their properties.
BAN-logic [BAN96] was designed for the analysis of authentication in security protocols and became very popular, but it is a known problem that a clear semantics, linking the high-level BAN-specification to runs of the protocol, is still missing. Also in other interesting recent work concerning Dynamic Epistemic Logic [GG97, Bal01, HMV04] with an operational flavor, it turns out that protocol specification is rather subtle and ad hoc. The same lack of a proper semantics can be seen even in tool-supported temporal epistemic approaches [RL06, HW02] , where existing temporal specification languages are used, but the embedding of the epistemic aspects remains (for a large part) informal. We start from the other side -a process specification language with a formal semantics, and work towards properly integrating epistemic aspects.
Interpreted Systems [FHMV95, RL06, HO05] are close to the operational semantics of our process language. In fact, it is possible to translate ALTSs defined by our SOS rules to interpreted systems. Our key improvement is the introduction of a process specification language with a formal semantics, which enables the modelling of systems at a reasonable abstraction level.
The concept of indistinguishability used here bears resemblances to the data independence technique in [Bro01] . We consider runs of a protocol indistinguishable if they appear equal to a principal (as defined by the visibility range of actions and their public appearance). It is worthwhile to investigate an extension of our framework along the lines of [Bro01] , by allowing the visibility range of actions to be dynamically updated.
Finally, concurently with our work, efforts have been made towards the development of a rich language C 3 [BKN06] and a powerful logic CPL [Kra06] for analyzing cryptographic protocols. That framework is comparable to ours, although specifically geared towards cryptography. The aim there is integrating a wide range of features, from deontic and spatial operators to probabilities, in one unified setting. C 3 +CPL is therefore very expressive, but very complex and seems difficult to implement, while our simple language with an easy to grasp operational semantics can immediately serve as basis for a practical verification toolset. In fact, a prototype implementation already exists [PAi] .
In [HO05] , the notion of interpreted systems is used to model and verify anonymity. There, a system consists of a number of agents and the semantics of a system is given in terms of sequences of tuples comprising local states of individual agents. Afterwards, different notions of (probabilistic) anonymity are defined using their epistemic logic formulation. Our approach is related to and complements that one, by providing a way of verifying, on process-based specifications, anonymity notions as defined by [HO05] .
Overview Section 2 introduces our generic process language for specifying protocols and a transition-system semantics for it. Section 3 defines our temporal epistemic logic Eµ and defines how the formulas should be interpreted on the transition systems. Then we show that this construction does indeed bridge the gap between process-based and epistemic-logic-based approaches to protocol analysis, by proving that its projections on the two worlds are consistent with established definitions in the two worlds separately (Section 4). Section 5 shows an example and Section 7 concludes the paper and presents directions for future research.
PAi : Syntax and Operational Semantics
In this section, we present the syntax and the operational semantics of a simple modeling language which we call process algebra with identities (PAi ) . PAi has generic features, that can be adapted to match constructs of any classical operational modeling language (such as CCS [Mil80] , CSP [BHR84] or Spi-Calculus [AG99] ). It resembles Milner's CCS, but we deviate from CCS in a few ways. Apart from adding identities, we use sequential composition instead of action prefixing (and thus, we also introduce a termination predicate), since this is very handy in writing protocol specifications. Also, we do not hide the result of a communication automatically and leave this, if at all desired, to the renaming function since the communicated message can be of relevance in the correctness specification of the protocol.
PAi : syntax Let Act be a finite set of action names which will be ranged over by a, b, a 0 , ?a, !a, . . ., and let Id be a finite set of identities typically denoted by by i, j, . . . i 1 , i 2 , . . .. We designate an action τ ∈ Act to denote the internal (silent) action; in addition to its common process-algebraic meaning, an internal action here represents a message that offers no new information to the observer principal. Question mark and exclamation mark (preceding actions) represent the receiving and the sending parts of a communication, respectively, and an action without such marks is the outcome of the communication.
P roc ::= 0 | D | P roc; P roc | P roc + P roc | P roc||P roc D ::= (J)α 0 denotes inaction (the process that has terminated). d = (J)α ∈ D denotes a decorated action and has the following intuitive meaning: action α ∈ Act is taken and is visible to principals i ∈ J ⊆ Id, while principals j / ∈ J observe ρ(a) being taken, where ρ : Act → Act is a global renaming function, which assigns to every action its "public appearance". The renaming function ρ should be defined by the specifier of a protocol but we assume that ρ(τ ) is always defined to be τ . For any other action a, if ρ(a) = τ , then (J)a becomes unobservable to the principals not in J. The combination of identity annotations on actions and the action renaming provides different views on the behavior of the system, according to different principals. Modeling passive observation of a system by hiding parts of it to specific principals is already done in the literature [SS96] , but we will generate the views for all principals simultaneously. This enables talking about properties such as "i knows that j knows that k has communicated message a". P roc; P roc denotes sequential composition, P roc + P roc denotes nondeterministic choice, and P roc || P roc denotes parallel composition.
Example 1. As a small example of a PAi process, take P = (1)a ; (1, 2)d + (1)b + (1)c, with the renaming function ρ(a) = ρ(b) = ρ(c) = dummy where dummy is a dummy basic action and over the identity set Id = {1, 2}. P denotes the process that executes one of the actions a,b,c, but only principal 1 is aware of the exact action taking place. 1 could be the principal making a choice between actions a,b and c, and 2 could be an observer who only notices that a choice has been made, but not what the outcome was. This would be a process-style formalization of the private communication from epistemic modeling, where a party learns something while other parties watch and learn that the party learned something, but not precisely what. After the first step, the process terminates or, if the first step was a, continues with the execution of d. Since principal 2 is allowed to observe the execution of d, she may now conclude that the first step Fig. 1 . SOS of PAi must have been a, although 2 was not actually allowed to observe the a. This is exactly the type of information leaks that we aim at capturing with our verification framework. The rightmost model in Figure 3 is the state space generated from this process specification, using the semantic rules introduced in the next section. The fact that 2 is not aware which first step has been taken is represented by 2 not being able to distinguish between the three possible destination states. By tuning the ρ function, we can get various levels of action visibility for the observing party 2. Namely, if we define ρ(a) = ρ(b) = ρ(c) = τ , then P describes the process where principal 1 is the target of a secret communication, in the sense that 1 executes the choice a + b + c, while 2 sees all four states -the one before the choice and the three after the choice -as one state. To the other extreme, if ρ is the identity function ρ(a) = a, ρ(b) = b, ρ(c) = c, then 1 and 2 are both fully aware of the actual step taken in the system (public announcement).
PAi : operational semantics We introduce the notion of Annotated Labeled Transition Systems (ALTS) as labeled transition systems extended with annotations that denote when two states are deemed indistinguishable from the viewpoint of a principal, based on the actions taken so far. This is determined by the information that a principal receives in the course of protocol execution. For instance, if during a particular communication transition a principal does not receive any new information (since the principal's identity is not in the visibility range of the action and the action is renamed to τ ), the principal would consider the source and the target states of such transitions indistinguishable.
Definition 1 (ALTS). Given the set Act, an ALTS is a 5-tuple St, → , , I, s 0 , where St is the set of operational states, → ⊆ St × Act × St is the transition relation, ⊆ St is the termination predicate, I ⊆ St × Id × St is the indistinguishability relation and s 0 is the initial state. In the above definition, the transition relation → has exactly the same role and meaning as in the standard notion of LTS. Formula s means that in state s it is possible to terminate.
Expression s 0 i · · · s 1 denotes that the principal with identity i cannot distinguish s 0 from s 1 since both s 0 and s 1 are reachable through paths that look identical as far as as principal i can observe and distinguish. It is desirable for i · · · to be an equivalence relation for each i ∈ Id since this leads to a natural representation of knowledge (i.e., S5 Kripke models in modal logic, see [FHMV95] ).
In Figure 1 , we associate ALTS's to PAi processes by means of a semantics in the SOS style of [Plo04] . The operational state of PAi is a pair (p, π) where p ∈ P roc is a PAi process and π is a finite sequence of decorated actions recording the perception of the process gathered so far. First we define auxiliary relations = defines when two traces are deemed indistinguishable by principal i. In the deduction rule (strip), we strip off the extra information on the labels (concerning the visibility range) and apply encapsulation (leaving out individual send and receive actions) and obtain the transition relation → .
3 Deduction rule (I) lifts the concept of indistinguishability from traces to operational states. For brevity, we omitted symmetric rules (n1), (n3), (p1), (p4), (= ρ3), (= τ 1), and (= τ 3) . Termination of a process is orthogonal to its past history, so we use different meta-variables for the traces in the premises and the conclusion of rules (s2), (n2), and (p2). The transition relation ⇒ and indistinguishability relation · · · are the sets of all closed statements provable using the deduction rules (plus their symmetric versions) from Proof. Once we prove that i = is an equivalence, the lemma follows immediately. Thus, we proceed with the proof of equivalence for i =.
Reflexivity follows vacuously from (= refl). For symmetry, the proof goes by an induction on the sum of the lengths of sequences π 0 and π 1 in π 0 i = π 1 . The base case, where π 0 = π 1 = [] follows vacuously from (refl). For the induction step, we distinguish different cases based on the last deduction rule in the proof. The rest of the proof is straightforward but is given for the sake of completeness.
, and a 0 = a 1 . It follows from the induction hypothesis that π 1 i = π 0 and by applying the deduction rule (= ρ0), we obtain π 1
, and a 0 = ρ(a 1 ). Then, it follows from the induction hypothesis that π 1 i = π 0 and by applying (= ρ3), we have π 1 i = π 0 . (= ρ3) Symmetric to the above case. 3 We could have used an explicit encapsulation (restriction) operator but decided not to do so to keep the presentation simple. 4 We intentionally did not add deduction rules to enforce symmetry and transitivity of i = explicitly in order to preserve the inductive structure of our SOS specification. = π 2 (due to symmetry, it suffices to consider the cases in one particular order and the other case can be obtained from the one considered by symmetry). Most of the cases are straightforward but all cases are checked for the sake of completeness.
The case is vacuous if one of the deduction rules is (refl).
It follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = π 2 and from i ∈ J 0 ∩ J 1 and i ∈ J 1 ∩ J 2 that i ∈ J 0 ∩ J 2 and from a 0 = a 1 and a 1 = a 2 that a 0 = a 2 . By applying (= ρ0) on these hypothesis, we have π 0 i = π 2 which was to be shown.
. Impossible since from i ∈ J 0 ∩ J 1 it follows that i ∈ J 1 and this contradicts i / ∈ J 0 ∪ J 1 . From this point on, we do not repeat the structure of π 0 , π 1 , and π 2 ; when needed and unless we state otherwise, we assume the decomposition mentioned in the above items.
. It follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = π 2 and from i ∈ J 0 ∩ J 1 and i ∈ J 1 \ J 2 that i ∈ J 0 \ J 2 and from a 0 = a 1 and a 1 = ρ(a 2 ) that a 0 = ρ(a 2 ). By applying (= ρ0) on these hypothesis, we have π 0 i = π 2 which was to be shown.
∈ J 1 , a 0 = a 1 and ρ(a 1 ) = τ . Impossible since it follows from i ∈ J 0 ∩ J 1 that i ∈ J 1 and this contradicts i / ∈ J 1 . (x), (= τ 1) (Assume that the last deduction rule used to derive π 1 i = π 2 is (= τ 1); the last deduction rule used to derive π 0
∈ J 2 , and ρ(a 2 ) = τ . It follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = π 2 , we already have i / ∈ J 2 and ρ(a 2 ) = τ . By applying (= τ 1) on these hypothesis, we have π 0 i = π 2 which was to be shown. (= ρ0), (= τ 2) Then, π 1 = π 1 (J 1 )τ , for some π 1 and J 0 such that π 0 = π 2 which was to be shown. Note that we do not need to consider the symmetric cases, e.g., (= ρ1), (= ρ0) since they follow from symmetry and the other cases due to symmetric rules, e.g., (= ρ0) and (= ρ2).
) and ρ(a 1 ) = ρ(a 2 ). Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have π 0 i = π 2 and by i / ∈ J 0 ∪ J 1 and i / ∈ J 1 ∪ J 2 , we have i / ∈ J 0 ∪ J 2 and by ρ(a 0 ) = ρ(a 1 ) and ρ(a 1 ) = ρ(a 2 ), we have ρ(a 0 ) = ρ(a 2 ). Thus, it follows from applying (= ρ1) on these hypothesis that π 0
) and a 2 = ρ(a 1 ). Then, it follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = p 1 ; it also follows from i / ∈ J 0 ∪ J 1 and i ∈ J 2 \ J 1 that i ∈ J 2 \ J 0 ; moreover, from ρ(a 0 ) = ρ(a 1 ) and a 2 = ρ(a 1 ) that ρ(a 0 ) = a 2 . Thus, by applying (= ρ3), we have π 0 i = π 2 . (= ρ1), (= τ 0) It follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = π 2 ; we also have that ρ(a 0 ) = ρ(a 1 ) = τ and i / ∈ J 0 ∪ J 1 , thus i / ∈ J 1 and by applying (τ 0 ), we derive π 0 i = π 2 .
(= ρ1), (= τ 2) Then, a = b = τ and it follows from the induction hypothesis that π 0 i = π 2 . Thus, by applying (= τ 2), we have that 
An epistemic mu-calculus
We introduce an epistemic mu-calculus with past (Eµ) which combines temporal, epistemic, and fixed point constructs. We give our logic an interpretation on the operational model introduced in Section 2.
Syntax The syntax of Eµ is given by the following grammar:
where a ranges over the set of actions (a ∈ Act). Then a φ stands for "after some execution of a, φ holds"; a φ has the same intuition as a φ, except that it refers to the past, i.e., there is a state in which φ holds and from which it is possible to take an a-step to the current state. K i φ should be read as "principal i knows that φ holds". The greatest fixed point operator νX.φ(X) is used to define recursive concepts. It intuitively means that the current state is in the largest set X of states that satisfy φ(X). (Here X is a variable ranging over propositional formulas, which can be identified by the sets of states in which such a formula is true. This is made formal by introducing valuations, but we leave this correspondence informal here.) For convenience, we define and use the following abbreviations for commonly used logical formulae:
µX.φ(X) (with X occurring positively in φ) is the least fixed point operator, which is defined by ¬νX.¬φ(¬X) (X also occurs positively in ¬φ).
The current state is in the smallest set of states satisfying φ(X). φ (similarly, φ) stands for a∈Act a φ ( a∈Act a φ), which is by itself an abbreviation for a finite number of disjunctions. Intuitively, it means that after (before) some transition φ holds. a (similarly, a ) is an abbreviation for µX. a ∨ x .X (or µX. a ∨ x .X). So, it is possible to reach a state in the future where an a-transition is possible (go back to a state in the past that results from an a-transition).
The intuition behind this abbreviation is that all future paths will (paths in the past) lead to a state, in which there is a state satisfying φ. ( * φ and * φ are defined accordingly.)
, meaning: "it is common knowledge among the principals in the set J that φ holds".
Common knowledge is a very powerful construction, expressing that agents in J not only know that φ holds, but also that all agents in J know that φ holds, and that all agents in J know that all agents in J know that φ holds, and so on. This property has so far not been amenable to specification and verification with standard operational techniques, while it is in fact very interesting, particularly for protocols where trust is an issue. Common knowledge can express, for instance, that participants in a multiparty fair exchange protocol trust each other and the protocol they are running. Let Eµ-forms denote the set of Eµ formulas.
Interpreting Eµ formulas on ALTSs
We now define what it means for a formula φ ∈ Eµ-forms to be satisfied in the ALTS A.
Definition 2 (satisfaction). Let A = S, → , , I, s 0 be an ALTS. The satisfaction relation |= for formulas φ ∈ Eµ-forms is defined inductively as follows: know it before. This is the case in the example depicted in Figure 3 
Proof. S5 is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Kripke models where the indistinguishability relations are equivalence relations (cf. e.g. The definition of satisfaction provides a model checking algorithm, that will be decidable on the finite trees generated by the semantics of our PAi . Since the Eµ satisfaction relation on ALTSs rests on classically accepted definitions for similar but less expressive models, we expect that it should be possible to reuse and extend existing efficient model checking tools.
An interesting and non-trivial question is to find a behavioral equivalence that is characterized by Eµ. We expect the answer to be some notion of bisimilarity that considers both a → and i · · · as transition relations. Due to the presence of past temporal operators, we may have to resort to some notion of bisimilarity that takes backward steps also into account (a notion of forward-backward or history-preserving bisimilarity).
Bridging the gap: relation to existing theories
In this section we show that the framework introduced in this paper is a conservative extension of the traditional process theoretic modelling on the one hand, and epistemic modelling on the other hand. To this end, we prove that the satisfaction relation defined in Section 3 preserves the standard satisfaction relations of µ (µ-calculus with past) formulae on labeled transition systems and of E (epistemic logic) formulae on Kripke structures. Figure 3 illustrates the three semantic models discussed in this section: the existing LTS and KS, and the newly introduced ALTS. Fig. 3 . An ALTS A (rightmost), together with its projections: 'the temporal part' lts(A) (leftmost) and 'the epistemic part' em(A) (center). In lts(A), the points are states, the arrows are transitions. In em(A), points are possible worlds and lines are indistinguishability relations labeled with identities of agents. In (A), the points are states and possible worlds simultaneously. Both temporal and epistemic relations are present. The epistemic valuation in a state is given by the actions executed from the initial state to that state. In the initial state, combined temporal epistemic formulae hold like a (K1a ∧¬K2a ) -expressing that after an a-action, it is known to principal 1 that action a has been executed, but 2 doesn't know that. However, 2 knows that one of the actions a,b,c has been executed ( a (K2(a ∨ b ∨ c )) ). More interestingly, after step d is executed, 2 has learned that a must have been the first step: a d K2a . Modeling this phenomenon of agents learning facts that were never explicitly told to them is exactly the power of epistemic logic approaches, that we took over in the combined framework.
transition relation, ⊆ St is the termination predicate and s 0 is the initial state. It typically represents the behavior of a reactive system in terms of states and transitions. Then requirements formulated in a temporal logic are matched against this behavior in the process of model checking.
A very general logical language to reason about processes is the µ-calculus with past (µ) [Nie98] , which is obtained by leaving out the knowledge construct K i φ from the syntax of our logic presented in Section 3. That a state s in the LTS T = S, → , , s 0 satisfies a µ formula φ (denoted T, s |= µ φ) is defined inductively as follows:
T, s |= µ iff true T, s |= µ ¬φ iff T, s |= µ φ T, s |= µ φ 1 ∧ φ 2 iff T, s |= µ φ 1 and s |= µ φ 2 T, s |= µ a φ iff exists s ∈ S, s.t. s a → s and T, s |= µ φ T, s |= µ a φ iff exists s ∈ S, s.t. s a → s and T, s |= µ φ T, s |= µ νX.φ(X) iff s ∈ {S ⊆ S|∀s ∈ S .T, s |= µ φ(X := S )} We prove that the ALTS + Eµ model checking framework properly extends the LTS + µ model checking framework, in the sense that whatever was possible in the latter, is still possible and has the same meaning in the former. This is witnessed by the fact that LTS + µ can be immediately obtained by simply stripping the ALTS from the I relations and the Eµ logic from the epistemic operator K i . The following theorem formalizes this. Proof. Straightforward, since the definitions of |= and |= µ are identical for the µ fragment of Eµ.
This means that for purely temporal aspects of correctness, one can safely ignore the epistemic aspects of our semantics and our logic.
Projecting into the epistemic domain Epistemic logics are mainly concerned with expressing subtle properties of communication acts, related to the knowledge, beliefs and intentions of communicating parties. In standard epistemic logic (following [Hin62] ), epistemic properties are validated in static rich snapshots of communications (epistemic models), that don't express the temporal evolution of the system. The language of epistemic logic with common knowledge is defined by:
Here the p comes from a given set of propositional variables Prop. These propositions represent the atomic facts the agents may know about. The subscript i ranges over a given set of agents I, and J over subsets of I. The standard reading of the epistemic modalities K i and C J is the same as ours in the previous section: "i knows that. . . " and "it is common knowledge among the agents in J that. . . ", respectively. An epistemic (S5-)model is a Kripke structure W, {R i |i ∈ I}, V , where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R i is an equivalence relation on W for each i ∈ I, and V : Prop → P(W ) is a valuation function assigning to each propositional variable the set of worlds in which it holds. Given an epistemic model M and world s ∈ W , satisfaction (|= E ) is defined recursively as follows:
To isolate 'the epistemic part' of our framework, we make suitable choices for the set of propositions, and the set of agents. In the context of our PAi -processes we associate with every action a ∈ Act a proposition a (which can be read as "a has been executed sometime before"), and we let Prop := {a|a ∈ Act} ∪ { }. Furthermore, we let I be our set of identities Id. We call the resulting logic E. We can then say that our modelling and verification framework is also conservative when it comes to purely epistemic aspects. Namely, if we restrict the ALTS associated with a PAi process to the I relations, we obtain an epistemic model where purely epistemic formulas hold exactly when they hold in the original ALTS, according to the Eµ satisfaction relation. Let us define an embedding E : E-forms → Eµ-forms of formulas into Eµ formulas, by taking E(a) = a and extending from there:
The following theorem formally expresses the conservativeness of Eµ w.r.t. E. Proof. Let φ be an arbitrary EL formula. We prove both implications simultaneously by induction on the structure of φ:
Immediate, by definition of |= and |= E : A, Besides the conservation of standard epistemic model checking, our framework also meets another relevant characteristics of epistemic modelling. Namely, we can show that the behavior part of an ALTS preserves the property of perfect recall ('no forgetting' in [HV88] ) for the epistemic part, in the sense that knowledge accumulated is not lost. To formalize this, we need to refine the transition relation → , for a fixed identity i, into update transitions and invisible transitions. Therefore, let Theorem 4 (perfect recall). Let A be a fixed ALTS generated by the SOS rules, as above, and let i ∈ Id be any identity. For any states s, t, s , t ∈ St and any n ∈ Nat, if s i n s , t i n t and
(where i n denotes the application of i n times).
We prove the theorem by a sequence of lemmas:
Lemma 2. For any a ∈ Act and p, q, π, π , if
Proof. It follows immediately from rule (a), which is the only rule that affects the construction of histories.
Lemma 3 (one-step). Let A be an ALTS produced by the SOS. If s, s , t, t are reachable states
Proof. s a → t and s b → t have been generated by rule (strip) and t i · · · t has been generated by rule (I), so there exist (τ 1) The argument is symmetric to the one used for (τ 0). We obtain s i · · · t.
(τ 2) Then a = τ and the premise translates to π 0
Lemma 4 (update). Let A be an ALTS produced by the SOS and let i ∈ Id be an identity. If s, s , t, t are reachable states in St s.t.
Proof 
An example protocol: Dining Cryptographers
In order to illustrate the relative advantages of the combined framework compared to using exclusively the operational approach or the epistemic one, we discuss the Dining Cryptographers protocol [Cha88] , which has already been independently and extensively analyzed using both operational [SS96, BP05] and epistemic approaches [HS04, HO05, RL04] . This is a well-known example of a protocol in which anonymity is the main requirement. The story, a metaphor for anonymous broadcast, is about three cryptographers having dinner together. At the end, they learn that the bill has been paid anonymously by one of them, or by the NSA (the National Security Agency). They respect each other's right to anonymity, but they wish to find out whether the payer was NSA or not. To this end, they come up with the following protocol: each neighboring pair of cryptographers generates a shared bit, by flipping a coin; then each cryptographer computes the exclusive or (XOR) of the two bits she sees, then announces the result -or the flipped result, if she was herself the payer. The XOR of the three publicly announced results indicates whether the payer was an insider or NSA.
Model A model of this protocol in our process language is shown in Figure 4 . Inspired by the input construction in the algebraic specification language µCRL, we use x:{x1...xn} P (x) as an abbreviation for P (x 1 ) + . . . + P (x n ), where {x 1 . . . x n } is a finite set and P (x i ) denotes the process expression P (x) in which x i has been substituted for x. The model is rather close to the CSP description presented in [SS96] , the only significant difference being that the actions are annotated with identities from the set Id = {1, 2, 3, M}. Note that the parameters used in the basic actions and process definitions are just generic names for the concrete instances resulting from instantiating them. For example, ?pay(i, b) is not defined in our process language but rather it stands for a number of instances such as ?pay(1, ), ?pay(i, ⊥) each of which are basic actions (obtained by globally replacing i and b with a member of Id and {⊥, } in the process definition each time). The behavior of the ith cryptographer is specified by the process Crypt(i) and the behavior of the whole DC system as a parallel composition of Crypt(i)'s and the M aster process:
A cryptographer process executes a series of actions corresponding to the three big steps of the protocol: decide whether to pay or not, flip the coins together with the neighbors, and announce the result of XOR-ing the two coins and her own paying bit. The first step is modeled as a statement pay(i, b), which is in fact a communication step with the M aster. The second step is modeled by the processes CryptF lip(i) and CryptShare(i). In other existing models [SS96, BP05] , the shared coins are represented by separate processes, but in order to keep the specification simple, we merge the behavior of the ith coin with the behavior of the ith cryptographer. Therefore, process Crypt(i) will execute a f lip action and then share the result with the right-hand neighbor, by executing an action !share which will synchronize with the ?share from the next cryptographer in the ring.
CryptBcast models the last phase, announcing the result of one's computation (!bcast), receiving the results from all the others (?bcast) and concluding for itself that N SA paid or not (nsa(i, ), nsa(i, ⊥)).
The renaming function ρ specifies how much of a cryptographers' actions is visible for observing parties. For any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and b ∈ { , ⊥}, we define
where pay(1), bcast(1, ), . . . are basic actions.
Analysis Figure 5 shows the top part of the ALTS generated by the rules in Figure 1 from the process specification in Figure 4 . We check relevant functional and epistemic properties of this protocol by matching Eµ formulas against this ALTS, as dictated by the satisfaction relation |= (Definition 2).
First of all, we can check functional correctness, by asking for instance that in all executions where one of the cryptographers paid, the action nsa(1, ) is eventually observable, meaning that the first cryptographer draws the right conclusion that the payer was an insider. This requirement is a purely temporal formula, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
.
Better yet, we can check the following temporal epistemic statement, for each i ∈ I.
[pay
nsa(j, ⊥) ) which expresses the fact that "everybody knows that the payer is an insider" eventually becomes common knowledge among the three cryptographers. Anonymity, the main goal of the protocol, is not expressible as a purely temporal property, but it is conveniently expressible as a temporal epistemic property. The anonymity of cryptographer i (holding in the initial state of our model) is specified by the following formula:
All these properties are satisfied by our PAi model, according to the satisfaction relation |= defined in Section 3.
Comparison to other DC models Our process language allows a simple and operational modeling, just as intuitive as any other process language, see also for instance a CSP model [SS96] and a pi-calculus model [BP05] of the Dining Cryptographers. All these models are definitely closer to the protocol description than logic models [HW02, RL06] and moreover, they are supported by a semantics which formally links the description of a protocol to its actual behavior model.
On the other hand, epistemic logic models allow expressing and checking anonymity as epistemic formulae, which is much more natural than the equivalence checking method employed in the process theoretic approach. More precisely, operational approach to verification of anonymity requires writing down new descriptions for each anonymity property that has to be checked, because these properties are dependent on the point of view of the observer. In the ALTS that our specification generates, all points of view are simultaneously present, thus a direct and natural (epistemic) verification is possible.
Implementation
We have implemented the semantics of PAi and a subset of our Eµ logic in the rewriting logic of Maude. This subsets includes the basic temporal and epistemic operators; however, instead of defining the general fixpoint construction, we restricted our attention to a few useful acronyms (involving fixpoints) defined in Section 3. Our implementation enables one to investigate the behavior of protocols specified in PAi by generating their traces (simulating them), and verifying Eµ formulae on them. The current implementation can be enhanced considerably in terms of efficiency and is only meant to be a working prototype for our theory and small examples therein (such as the case study of Section 5). Next, we present a brief overview of the implementation.
PAi in Maude
The syntax of PAi is modeled in Maude as follows. . op sync ( _ ) _ : IdSet Act -> BDAct [ctor] .
In the above specification Act, DAct and Proc are sorts for basic actions, decorated actions and processes, respectively. ctor designates constructors of each sort. In this case, tau is defined to be an action. rcv, snd and sync define decorated actions for send, receive and synchronization (or just non-communicating actions, denoted in the original syntax by ?, and without any preceding mark, respectively). In the above specification, the subsort expression defines that each decorated action is process, other definitions define NIL (denoted in the original syntax by 0), ;, + and || as constructors of the sort Proc. Expression prec i defines their precedence (binding power); operators with a lower i bind stronger.
The implementation of our operational semantics (given in Figure 1 ) is a straightforward translation of the deduction rules. In our Maude formalization, termination is modeled by a set of equations and transitions are modeled by a set of rewrite rules For example deduction rules (0), (a) and (s1) are implemented as follows.
eq ( tick NIL ) = true . rl $* ( d , pi) => ( {d} R ( NIL , pi^d ) ) .
crl $* ( p0 ; p1 , pi) => ( {d} R ( pp1 , pip ) ) if ( tick p0 ) /\ $* ( p1, pi ) => ( {d} R ( pp1, pip ) ) .
In the above specification eq stands for equality and rl and crl stand for rewrite and conditional rewrite rules, respectively. We use the auxiliary symbol $* at the left-hand side of the rewrite rules to designate this particular type of transition, denoted in our semantics with ⇒ .
In the semantics, we have another transition relation, denoted by → . Instead of defining → in terms of ⇒ , as in (strip), for the sake of efficiency, we implemented → directly by stripping down the decorated action in each semantic rule. For example, for the three deduction rules for ⇒ specified above, we get the following corresponding rules for → (in the following rules $ designates the transition relation → ).
rl $ ( ( sync (I) a ) , pi) => ( {a} r ( NIL , pi^sync (I) a ) ) .
crl $ ( p0 ; p1 , pi) => ( {a} r ( pp1 , pip ) ) if ( tick p0 ) /\ $ ( p1, pi ) => ( {a} r ( pp1, pip ) ) .
Finally, the concept of indistinguishability is formalized in Maude. The following two equalities, represent deduction rules (= refl) and (= ρ0) in Figure 1 . eq ( pi obseq ( i ) pi ) = true . ceq ( ( pi^( sync (I)a ) ) obseq ( i ) ( pip^( sync (J)a ) ) ) = true if ( ( pi obseq ( i ) pip ) and ( i in ( I cap J ) ) ) .
Eµ in Maude
The syntax of a subset of Eµ is formalized in Maude as follows. The formalization of the semantics of logical connectors is straightforward. We write s0 s |= phi for the semantics of formula phi at state s in an LTS with the initial state s0 (with the semantics given before). The following conditional rewrite rule, for example, specifies the semantics of emand. crl ( s0 (p, pi) |= ( phi emand psi ) ) => ( b0 and b1 ) if ( s0 (p, pi) |= phi ) => b0 /\ ( s0 (p, pi) |= psi ) => b1 .
The semantics of temporal and epistemic constructs is a bit more involved and makes use of the reflective semantics of Maude. For example, consider the following semantics of the operator <a> .
crl [atrue] : ( s0 (p, pi) |= ( < a > phi ) ) => true if trans {a} (p, pi) => target (pp , pip) /\ ( s0 (pp, pip) |= phi ) => true . crl ( s0 s |= ( < a > phi ) ) => false if ( not ( isaTrue ( upTerm ( s0 s |= ( < a > phi ) ) ) ) ) .
If at state (p, pi) a transition labeled with a is enabled, it is easy to establish that <a> phi is true; it suffices to find a transition labeled with a at the target of which formula phi holds. This is naturally captured by the first conditional rewrite rule, labeled atrue, given above. However, to establish that <a> phi is false, either all transition labeled with a lead to a state in which phi does not hold, or there is no transition labeled with a enabled at (p, pi). Both these statements involve checking the impossibility of a certain transition which can be achieved through the reflective semantics of Maude. In other words, propositions like isaTrue and rMove involve using the metalevel function metaXapply which gives us information about possibility of applying a certain rewrite rule on a term. The following is the implementation of function rMove.
ceq isaTrue ( t ) = isfalse? :: Result4Tuple if isfalse? := metaXapply(['EmuBasic], t , 'atrue , none , 0, unbounded, 0 ) .
The above function returns whether it is possible to apply rewrite rule atrue (given before) on term t. A similar approach has been taken in the implementation of the semantics of other constructs such as [a] or K{ } .
Conclusion
Motivated by protocols and properties where much importance is given to the participating entities and not only to the actual evolution of the system -like certain security protocols, information flow -we presented a simple process language where the concept of identity is explicitly present. We gave it an operational semantics in terms of an extended form of labeled transition systems and defined a satisfaction relation for properties expressed in a rich logic combining temporal and epistemic operators. The result is a specification and verification framework that combines the best parts of two complementary approaches to protocol analysis: process algebras and epistemic logics. Our framework is particularly suitable for modeling and verification of protocols on top of authenticated secret channels, ensured for instance by a Public Key Infrastructure. In these protocols, the security threats typically do not come from an external intruder controlling the communication channels, but from the participants themselves. Examples are protocols for fair exchange, voting, auctions, anonymity. In security protocols with cryptography or active attackers, some behavioral choices are determined by the current knowledge of the principals. In particular, a principal can distinguish more traces by gaining access to keys. To properly accommodate this, our framework should be extended, possibly by allowing dynamic update of indistinguishability relation in the course of protocol execution. Note however that the current framework is just as powerful in modeling cryptography aspects as any other (traditional) process algebra. So, for these cases, more research is needed in order to find the best way of integrating the elegancy of representing knowledge by indistinguishability relations with the ease of specifying the protocol operationally.
Future work First of all, we will build tool support for model checking Eµ properties on ALTSs. Ideally, this can be achieved by embedding the new framework in an existing verification tool-set. The starting point will be our already existing Maude prototype [PAi] .
Then we wish to experiment with applying this technique to protocols from the categories mentioned above. On a more theoretical direction, a question is whether it is possible to extend the sequent-based compositional proof system developed for the SOS + Hennessy-Milner Logic [Sim04] in order to cope with Eµ formulas, as well. Finally, this framework can support a direct comparison of the operational and epistemic definitions of various properties. For instance, anonymity is defined operationally as (trace) equivalence between certain processes, while epistemically it is simply a negative knowledge formula. The issue of which of these definitions is stronger, if any, is not clear yet and deserves further investigation.
